The COP's discussions about avian influenza have focussed on the potential impact on wildlife. 25 However, the WHO appears to conceive of avian influenza as something to which the CBD might apply, '[r] ecognizing the sovereign right of States over their biological resources ', 26 and this also appears to be the position of Indonesia. 27 Thus, for avian influenza viruses found within the sovereign jurisdiction of Indonesia there appears to be a strong argument that they could be 'genetic resources' for the purposes of the CBD
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Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 9 th mtg, [194]-[195] , UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (2008).
-this is arguably strengthened by the broad interpretation of this term to 25 See At least in theory, the property value established in the genetic resources by controlling access under the CBD can be distinguished from the value of the potential intellectual property from using that genetic resource, so that some of the value of the intellectual property can contribute to the compensation and incentive for biological diversity conservation. 87 At its most simple, the property rights over the accessed genetic resources under the CBD deal only with the tangible 'genetic resources'.
TRIPS patents, meanwhile, relate only to the intangible innovation and creativity in products and processes that result from using the biological resource. Thus a patent deals with an 'invention' that is novel, non-obvious, and industrially useful and described in a way that can be followed by others, and establishes property (or 'exclusive rights' to certain dealings with the 'invention'. These are different economy commodities, one the tangible genetic resource and the other the intangible application of that genetic resource for an innovative or creative and useful purpose. 
25
pandemic the response will require both improvements to domestic production capacity and efficacy of pandemic influenza vaccines targeted to the specific influenza variants. 104 The concern for countries of the South is that existing patents claiming a virus, or part of a virus composition per se, or a step in the development of a vaccine using a virus, or part of a virus composition per se, may prevent the use of that composition or require agreement with the patent holder to exercise the patented product, process or product of the process. 105 And while some of these patents may not be applicable in the particular jurisdiction, the technology necessary to develop efficient and effective vaccines needs to be accessed from patent holders in the countries of the North together with the related know-how and regulatory submissions data. 106 In short, intellectual property is a central concern in developing effective responses to avian influenza and the likely resultant pandemic. failing to provide a comprehensive consensus view, the interdisciplinary working group reported that the 'overriding concern expressed by most members … was that neither intellectual property rights nor prior informed-consent requirements, if any, should stand in the way of developing and producing a pandemic influenza vaccine'. 120 The interdisciplinary working group also reported on the content of the proposed terms and conditions. The group considered that no party receiving, handling or using virus specimens should claim ownership, 121 intellectual property claims needed to disclose the specimen's country of origin, and any 'financial gain' from an intellectual property should require an equivalent financial contribution to the WHO. 122 This latter agreement set out a range of benefit sharing options including:
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cash, access to technology, transfer of technology and know-how, and provision of vaccines and their developmental components. interdisciplinary working group then contributed to the subsequent intergovernmental meeting.
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The Director-General also convened an intergovernmental meeting 'to identify and propose, in close consultation with Member States, frameworks and mechanisms that aimed to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits'. 125 The outcome of this intergovernmental meeting was to identify and re-affirm the relevant 'guiding principles' for 'the sharing of, and access to, benefits that result from the sharing of influenza viruses '. 126 There was also an 'interim statement' from the intergovernmental meeting that appeared to accept that the existing domestic and international legal frameworks were not appropriate. and to 'establish an advisory mechanism to monitor, provide guidance to strengthen the functioning of the system and undertake necessary assessment of the trust-based system needed to protect public health' (an advisory mechanism While the final details of the agreement for accessing Indonesia's H5N1 viruses has been generalised by the WHO processes to accessing all viruses, the development towards agreement has followed the contours of the CBD (and TRIPS) obligations.
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That is, Indonesia has been specific in pressing its concerns about benefit sharing and tied these closely with the obligations established by the CBD. So, for example, the Indonesian proposal suggested the following 'fundamental elements' should be taken into account when developing any new system addressing access and benefit sharing:
The originating country providing access to virus: (1) retains sovereign rights over the virus and any virus material contained or incorporated in any substances or products created; (2) has the right to get immediately the results of the risk assessment; (3) has the right to timely receive seed virus and isolated virus at no cost; (4) has the right to participate in the execution of research and participate actively in publications; and (5) has the right to be adequately acknowledged.
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Within these 'fundamental elements' is embedded the 'sovereign rights' of Indonesia to regulate access to all viruses within its sovereign jurisdiction. As a party to the CBD this also coincides with the obligation that access must be from countries of origin or The concern for countries of the South is that existing patents may prevent the use of a patented product, process or product of the process thereby tying up the technology necessary to develop efficient and effective vaccines. 177 Enhancing the production capacity and efficacy of pandemic influenza vaccines almost certainly depends on technology accessed from patent holders in countries of the North together with the related know-how and regulatory submissions data. 178 These concerns are specifically reflected in Indonesia's 'fundamental elements' that should be taken into account when developing any new system addressing access and benefit sharing:
[A f]ramework of benefit sharing is to be developed through agreed terms and conditions to ensure global stockpile of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines, accessibility of vaccine at an affordable price, access to and transfer of technology and know-how for production of vaccines, and empowerment and capacity building of vaccine manufacturing in developing countries. 
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The challenge for the North who want access to the Indonesian H5N1 viruses is that complyiance with the CBD (and TRIPS) obligations is critical to mitigating their public health responses to pandemic influenza. This will require negotiation of a deal with Indonesia where Indonesia has the negotiating power and is in a position to dictate terms, including limiting the ownership of intellectual property, requiring the transfer of technology and know-how (probably establishing vaccine research and manufacturing facilities in Indonesia) and assistance in regulatory submissions data so that the vaccines are both safe and efficacious. The alternative will be to undermine the careful position which the countries of the North have engineered in establishing the paramountcy of TRIPS over the CBD and other policy objectives, and open the floodgates to the South's desire to limit the effect of TRIPS on the CBD and of TRIPS itself. In short, failure to negotiate a deal with Indonesia according to the terms and conditions agreeable to Indonesia opens up the debate about the paramountcy of intellectual property rights and TRIPS, and introduces the potential for other policy imperatives to override respect for intellectual property rights -in other words, if the North does not comply with its CBD and TRIPS rhetoric and commitments, why should the South?
